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INTRODUCTION
As a nation, we are often sentimental about the old in the abstract
but contemptuous of them in practice.' Our ambivalence about the
elderly can be seen at every point on a wide spectrum, ranging from
humor to discrimination in housing and employment. Inadequate
health care2 and deplorable conditions in many of the nation's nursing
homes3 are among the most obvious manifestations of our collective
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1 In many ways, America's attitude toward its elderly mirrors its attitude toward
its young: There is an enormous gap between the ideology of care and actual support
and resources. The widespread incidence of child abuse has been increasingly acknowl-
edged and documented, and, in part as a consequence, abuse of the elderly has begun to
be more fully recognized and documented. Interestingly, legislation aimed at curbing
abuse of the elderly has been modeled on anti-child abuse legislation. See Comment, A
Critical Analysis: The Patient Abuse Provisions of the Missouri Omnibus Nursing
Home Act, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 713, 713 (1981) (comparing the Missouri Omnibus
Nursing Home Act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 198.003 to 198.186 (Supp. 1980) with the
Missouri Child Abuse Statute, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.110 to 210.165 (1978)).
2 "Therapeutic nihilism" pervades institutionalized health care for the elderly and
makes it more likely that they will receive only custodial care rather than treatment.
See J. KRAUSKOPF, ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 3.1, at 30 (1983); see also M.
KAPP, PREVENTING MALPRACTICE IN LONG-TERM CARE 68 & n.2 (1987) (many
physicians' distaste for chronic care, especially of the elderly, is a significant factor in
the medical neglect of nursing home residents); Horstman, Protective Services for the
Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215, 234 (1975) ("[M]ost
institutionalized elderly are doomed to receive only custodial care.").
' As of 1974, the government estimated that half of the nursing homes in the
United States were "substandard." See SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., NURSING HOME CARE IN
THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY, SUPPORTING PAPER No. 1: THE
LITANY OF NURSING HOME ABUSES AND AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROOTS OF CON-
TROVERSY 205-209 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. But nursing
homes do not have to fall below certifiable standards to be damaging to their residents:
"They have been described as 'Houses of Death,' 'concentration camps,' 'warehouses
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abandonment of many elderly Americans.
These conditions have been widely noted and decried, but the
problems remain despite reformist legislation4 and a number of legisla-
tive subcommittee reports. 5 Our paradoxical attitude toward the elderly
helps explain, in part, why the conditions persist. Although the fear of
"ending up" in a nursing home against our will is probably universal,
the dumping of the elderly in hospitals and nursing homes remains a
pressing and generally unrecognized problem despite some significant
statutory protections.'
One factor that may contribute to the problem is our sense that it
is inevitable.' Many of us simply accept that to become old is to become
institutionalized and imprisoned. "Residents of nursing homes are liter-
ally captive and at the mercy of the institutions wherein they reside.
."8 This is business as usual, and our law reflects the norm.9
for the dying.' It is a documented fact that nursing home residents tend to deteriorate,
physically and psychologically, after being placed in what are presumably therapeutic
institutions." B. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOME TRAGEDY 3
(1980) (citations omitted).
" The regulation of nursing homes is outside the scope of this Comment. It is
relevant to note, however, the increased importance of state regulation, which in turn is
heavily influenced by federal statutes. This influence is reflected in the inclusion in
state nursing home statutes of residents' bills of rights and anti-fraud provisions, both
of which were first developed in the federal Medicare system. See S. JOHNSON, N.
TERRY & M. WOLFF, NURSING HOMES AND THE LAW: STATE REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LITIGATION § 1-1, at 2 (1985) [hereinafter S. JOHNSON].
I See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM.
ON AGING, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES:
FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY, INTRODUCTORY REPORT 1 (1974) [hereinafter SENATE
INTRODUCTORY REPORT] ("[I]n an alarming number of known cases [nursing home
residents] have actually encountered abuse and physical danger, including unsanitary
conditions, fire hazards, poor or unwholesome food, infections, adverse drug reactions,
overtranquilization, and frequent medical errors."); SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at
205 (stating that more than half of United States nursing homes are substandard).
6 Federal statutes and regulations afford some protection. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(j) (1982 & West Supp. 1988) (delineating requirements for skilled nursing
facilities); 42 C.F.R. §§ 442.200 to 442.202 (1987) (same); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(c) (1982 & West Supp. 1988) (delineating requirments for intermediate care
facilities); 42 C.F.R. §§ 442-250 to 442.346 (1987). State legislatures have also re-
sponded to the need for higher standards of care. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.20201 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); see also Comment, Michigan's Nursing
Home Reform Law, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661, 668 (1980) (discussing the criminal
sanctions for violating Michigan's nursing home reform law); infra notes 24-28 and
accompanying text (discussing state statutes granting patients private rights of action
against nursing homes).
' Cf SENATE INTRODUCTORY REPORT, supra note 5, at 11 ("Individuals with
multiple disabilities and advanced age are likely candidates for institutionalization.").
' Butler, A Long-Term Health Care Strategy for Legal Services, 14 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 613, 641 (1980).
' See infra notes 29-39; see also Butler, Book Review, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998,
1037 (1980) (reviewing B. VLADECK, supra note 3) ("Our society often prefers the
rights of private citizens and businesses over the rights of those for whom government
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This Comment argues that courts can use the tort of false impris-
onment to ensure that senior citizens confined to nursing homes or hos-
pitals are not confined against their will. Elderly nursing home patients
remain without rights to self-determination despite the protections ac-
corded two other groups: persons civilly committed in psychiatric hospi-
tals and those subject to guardianship proceedings. Although both the
commitment and guardianship processes are fraught with abuses, the
legal system has at least recognized the potential problerhs and has re-
sponded accordingly.1"
Indeed, many senior citizens who may not have been technically
"committed" to a nursing home are, nonetheless, constructively com-
mitted. While the law recognizes the right of a guardian to place an
unwilling person in a nursing home, even a guardianless old person
may, through circumstances beyond her control, find herself unwill-
ingly confined to a nursing home, without clearly defined legal
remedies.
This Comment explores the current and potential use of the tort of
false imprisonment to redress the elderly patient's lack of rights. It will
argue that the overarching problem-the dumping of elderly patients in
hospitals and nursing homes-needs to be set against a larger social
and political backdrop, and legal solutions need to be placed in context.
Specifically, this Comment contends that the disparity in status and re-
sources between the average elderly patient who is unwillingly confined
in a nursing home and the nursing home in which she resides places
her in constructive or de facto confinement. We should recognize this
confinement as equivalent to de jure commitment and grant concomi-
tant recognition and procedural protection.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. Conditions and Demographics
Conditions in nursing homes have been widely studied and fre-
quently decried. 1 It is worth considering the demographics of the pop-
has assumed direct responsibility.").
10 See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (civil commitment consti-
tutes a "massive curtailment" of a fundamental right); Big Town Nursing Home, Inc.
v. Newman, 461 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (finding nursing home guilty
of falsely imprisoning elderly plaintiff). See generally Annotation, False Imprisonment
in Connection with Confinement in Nursing Home or Hospital, 4 A.L.R.4th 449
(1981).
11 See, e.g., SENATE INTRODUCTORY REPORT, supra note 5, at III (calling nurs-
ing home care "the most troubled and troublesome component of our entire health care
system"); Comment, Nursing Home Access: Making the Patient Bill of Rights Work,
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ulation: there are nearly 1.5 million nursing home residents. The aver-
age nursing home resident is eighty-two years old, female, and
widowed with no viable relationships except a collateral relative of ap-
proximately the same age. She does not have many visitors and suffers
from chronic or crippling diseases and some degree of mental impair-
ment. She cannot walk and needs help to take a bath and get dressed.
She is afraid. Only four to nineteen percent of people who enter nurs-
ing homes get out alive.12
The fact that most residents receive no visitors1 underlines their
essential isolation and lack of access to legal help.14 Additionally, many
nursing home patients are chronically overmedicated, 5 which may un-
dermine a patient's successful opposition to guardianship or commit-
ment proceedings. 6
B. Warehousing of the Elderly
Psychiatric hospitals clearly have been abused as a means of deal-
ing with old people who are unwanted by their families or who do not
54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 473, 474 (1977) ("Nursing home residents are often abused,
and this abuse has been well documented.").
2 See Johnson, Nursing Home Receiverships: Design and Implementation, 24
ST. Louis U.L.J. 681, 681 n.1 (1981); Comment, supra note 11, at 473-74.
13 See Comment, The Old Age Wall: The Problem of Gaining Access to Nursing
Home Residents, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 709, 709 n.11 (1984) (discussing the
isolation of nursing home residents from outside social and legal services); see also SEN-
ATE INTRODUCTORY REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 ("Since most nursing home patients
are in their 70's and 80's, they may well have outlived their own children. Almost 50
percent have no viable relationship with a close relative, and another 30 percent have
only collateral relatives near their own age.").
' The isolation is very explicitly maintained by some nursing home administra-
tors, who try to keep out community groups interested in helping residents "by locking
the doors in an attempt to maintain the wall of silence between the residents and the
outside world, thus preventing the public from interfering with their management of
these business enterprises." Comment, supra note 13, at 710. While residents have
been endowed statutorily with certain rights, the battle to enforce those rights has to be
preceded by the battle to inform residents of them. The role of advocacy is crucial in
changing the overall situation for nursing home residents, but the barriers to effective
advocacy need to be recognized as part of the problem.
15 See, e.g., B. VLADECK, supra note 3, at 3 ("The overuse of potent medications
in nursing homes is a scandal in itself.").
1" In discussing how to prepare to defend patients in commitment and guardian-
ship proceedings, Krauskopf raises, as a "last matter to investigate," the problem of
medication changes before a hearing. J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 3.5, at 36-37.
She quotes advice that comes from the general context of psychiatric patients, but her
use of it implies that she sees the danger of deliberate or indifferent overmedication as
equally relevant in the context of geriatric commitment hearings and guardianship pro-
ceedings. See also Ennis, Trial Techniques, in B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF
MENTAL PATIENTS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A MENTAL PATIENT'S RIGHTS
app. B at 283, 294-95 (1973).
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have familial resources.' The patients' rights movement has responded
to that situation by making it harder to commit someone. 8 But as it
has become harder to stash difficult relatives in a psychiatric hospital, it
has become easier to put them in a nursing home:
The past decade has seen an assault on unwarranted mental
commitments at the same time as an increase in funding
sources has enabled a large growth in nursing homes. These
homes vary widely in quality; many are seriously inadequate
and offer an environment even more adverse to an elderly
person than a mental hospital. They are likely dumping
places for persons who would have been committed at one
time. 9
Ironically, however, the confined nursing home resident may be in
greater need of legal protection than the committed mental patient, a
11 See J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 29-30 (A large percentage of mental
institution inmates are elderly people who were committed for reasons of convenience
rather than the severity of their mental impairments.).
18 The legal and social dynamics of civil commitment are, of course, vast and com-
plex topics outside the scope of this paper. A comparison between the situation of the
civilly committed mental patient and the involuntarily confined nursing home resident
will be made at greater length in Part IV of this Comment. It has often been observed
that civil commitment may constitute a form of particularly dangerous social control.
Thomas Szasz goes further and argues that the very distinction between voluntary and
involuntary hospitalization is false and that many "voluntary" mental hospitalizations
are in fact involuntary. See Szasz, Voluntary Mental Hospitalization: An Unacknowl-
edged Practice of Medical Fraud, in MEDICINE, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 403, 404
(N. Kittrie, H. Hirsch & G. Wegner eds. 1975) ("[R]eview of the laws governing
voluntary psychiatric hospitalization makes it unmistakably clear that what is called
'voluntary mental hospitalization' is often actually a type of involuntary mental hospi-
talization . . . ."). But see Slovenko, Civil Commitment in Perspective, in MEDICINE,
LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra, at 360 (discounting Szasz's alarm). The involuntary
nature of this constraint is "revealed by the abridgements of [patients'] liberty to leave
the hospital that they have ostensibly entered of their own free choice." Szasz, supra, at
404. Szasz's concern may or may not be somewhat dated with respect to mental pa-
tients, but it remains very much on target for nursing home residents, who are assumed
to have freedom that they do not in fact possess. See, e.g., Pounders v. Trinity Court
Nursing Home, Inc., 265 Ark. 1, 576 S.W.2d 934 (1979) (en banc) (discussed supra
notes 40, 42, 49-50 and accompanying text). Interestingly, Szasz reportedly has urged
lawyers to combat the dangers of institutionalization by bringing false imprisonment
suits against those participating in the commitment process. See Slovenko, supra, at
363, 369 n.82 (citing Address by Thomas Szasz at The Annual Convention of the
American Trial Lawyers Association (Aug. 4, 1970), reported in PSYCHIATRIC NEWS,
Sept. 16, 1970, at 1).
19 J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 31; see also Swan, The Substitution of
Nursing Home for Inpatient Psychiatric Care, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J.,
Spring 1987, at 3, 14-16 (concluding from an empirical study that nursing home care is
substituted for inpatient psychiatric care and that Medicaid funding has played a major
role in the development of the nursing home industry as a proxy for state mental hospi-
tals for the elderly).
19891
908 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
fact courts have failed to recognize.
The policy of decarcerating institutionalized patients, begun as a
reform movement in the 1960s, has resulted in some significant
problems for elderly persons.20 Many people released from state mental
institutions have been dumped into communities where no resources are
available for their care. Elderly patients who are released frequently
end up in nursing homes.2 This seeming paradox-the institutional-
ization of the old in nursing homes as a result of their release from
psychiatric commitment-can also be explained by the influence of
Medicaid reimbursement22 in the development of the burgeoning for-
profit nursing home industry.2"
C. Statutory Attempts to Regulate Nursing Home Conditions
Some states have responded to the generally shabby conditions in
nursing homes by enacting statutes that give patients a private right of
action against nursing homes that violate basic standards of care.'
These actions may be brought by the residents themselves, by state
20 See J. WILLIAMSON, L. EVANS & L. POWELL, THE POLITICS OF AGING 237
(1982) [hereinafter J. WILLIAMSON].
21 See id. at 238.
22 "The development of public reimbursement for nursing home care, and the re-
sulting expansion of nursing homes and beds, were major factors in the deinstitutional-
ization from government mental hospitals. The nursing home replaced the state mental
hospital as the locus of care for aged and other mentally ill." Swan, supra note 19, at 3
(citations omitted).
2 Before the mid-1960s, most nursing homes, like other health care facilities,
were owned and operated by local governments or private charitable organizations. See
M. KAPP, supra note 2, at 63. Now the large majority of nursing homes are owned
and operated by proprietary corporations. See id. at 64. As of 1981, approximately 70
percent of nursing homes certified to receive residents under Medicare and/or Medi-
caid, representing 80 percent of the total number of nursing home beds, were operated
on a for-profit basis. See COMMITTEE ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES 9, 10, app. D
at 358 (1986). Multistate nursing home chains represent an increasingly large percent-
age of the rapidly increasing proprietary sector of the nursing home industry. See NA-
TIONAL SENIOR CrIzENs LAW CENTER, NURSING HOME LAW 2 (1982); supra note
106 and accompanying text.
24 S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 1-22, at 21 ("At least ten state nursing home
statutes have explicit provisions for private rights of action against facilities by resi-
dents, their guardians [or] family members . . . ."). For examples of such statutes, see
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1430 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-550 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111,
11 4153-4601 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70E (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 198.093 (1983 & Supp. 1988); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:13-8 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2801(d) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1918F
(West 1984); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-15 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
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agencies,25 or by other interested persons.26
Many of these statutes contain a patients' "bill of rights," violation
of which will support an action against the nursing home.27 These
rights typically include guarantees of freedom from chemical and physi-
cal restraints; privacy; confidentiality; prepared transfer; informed con-
sent; and freedom from abuse.28 To the extent that particular statutory
provisions cannot reasonably be construed to cover the situation in
which a nursing home resident is confined against her will, the need for
a common law remedy is clear.29
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE RUBRIC OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT
TO NURSING HOME CONFINEMENT
A. The Use of Tort: General Considerations
One might think that the notorious conditions in nursing homes
would have spawned a tremendous amount of litigation challenging the
care and treatment of nursing home residents. This has not been the
case. Litigation has centered primarily around negligence; the typical
nursing home case deals with a simple but poorly documented fall.30
Nevertheless, it has been argued that tort law can play an important
role:
The irony is that the modern system of tort litigation pos-
sesses the sophistication to make a meaningful contribution
to the improvement of long-term care. Tort law is flexible;
25 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-8 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (empowering
Department of Health to bring suit); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-123 (1987) (allowing
Department of Human Resources to bring suit).
26 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198-093(1) (Vernon 1983) (permitting an estate
of the resident to sue); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-8 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (al-
lowing a legal guardian, but not next of kin, to sue), construed in Profeta v. Dover
Christian Nursing Home, 189 N.J. Super. 83, 86-87, 458 A.2d 1307, 1309, cert de-
nied, 94 N.J. 576, 468 A.2d 217 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-123 (1987) (same).
27 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-550(b) (West 1986); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 111, § 70E (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.088
(Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-5 (West 1981).
28 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3721.13 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1987)
(listing the rights of nursing home residents); see also S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 1-
3, at 2-3 (discussing the similarity of most state nursing home statutes).
29 See Caldwell & Kapp, The Rights of Nursing Home Patients: Possibilities and
Limitations of Federal Regulations, 6 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 40, 47 (1981)
("The incontrovertible fact.., is that the most comprehensively written and vigorously
enforced regulations in the world can only work to a small degree to protect dependents
from abuse.").
20 See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-2, at 69; see also Butler, supra note 8, app.
A at 662-63 (listing reported nursing home cases, including the nature of injury, the
age and sex of plaintiff, the disposition of the case, and the damages when awarded).
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its practitioners are imaginative. Today's post-realist amal-
gam of economics and hornbook doctrine permits adventur-
ous functional manipulation to achieve not only compensa-
tion, but also finely tuned regulation."1
There are many reasons, in general, tort law has been inade-
quately used to remedy nursing home abuses and, in particular, few
false imprisonment claims have been filed against nursing homes. This
Comment argues that this dearth of cases represents not a lack of need,
but rather an undervaluing of essential rights that litigation may be
able to help protect. Tort law has only recently been recognized as an
important part of nursing home litigation-one that can address inade-
quate and inefficient government regulatory systems.3 The tort of false
imprisonment, in particular, has lagged behind.
B. Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman"3
An action for the intentional tort of false imprisonment may be
maintained against a nursing home. 4 In the leading case, Big Town
Nursing Home v. Newman, the plaintiff, who had "Parkinson's dis-
ease, arthritis, heart trouble, a voice impediment, and a hiatal hernia,"
was kept against his will in a nursing home.35 He tried to escape five
or six times but each time was brought back without his consent. He
was not allowed to use the telephone or have visitors unless the man-
ager knew them, 6 and he was locked up with "senile patients, drug
addicts, alcoholics, [the] mentally disturbed, incorrigibles, and uncon-
trollables," even though nursing home personnel knew this was inap-
propriate treatment for him. 37 The appellate court held that ample evi-
dence existed to support the jury's finding of false imprisonment,
concluding that the nursing home "acted in the utter disregard of plain-
tiff's legal rights, knowing there was no court order for commitment
and that the admission agreement provided he was not to be kept
against his will."38
An authority in the field of nursing home law has observed that
31 S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-2, at 69-70.
32 See id. § 3-2, at 69.
33 461 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
8 See id. at 196-97.
35 Id. at 196.
8 See id. at 197. Holding a patient incommunicado has been treated as a form of
restraint that may constitute false imprisonment. See Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich.
119, 135, 191 N.W.2d 355, 363 (1971); S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-11, at 81.
" Big Town, 461 S.W.2d at 197; see J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 23.12, at
487.
38 Big Town, 461 S.W.2d at 197.
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"[w]hen a nursing home knows of the disabled condition of a resident,
it would seem that little restriction would be needed to support a con-
tention of false imprisonment."3 9 Generally, however, this has not been
the case.
C. Pounders v. Trinity Court Nursing Home4 °
The other central case in this area is Pounders v. Trinity Court
Nursing Home, Inc. There, the plaintiff testified that she was not al-
lowed to have visitors, use the telephone, or write anyone. She was told
further that if she tried to run away, she would be brought back. One
of her reasons for not leaving was that the home had taken her shoes,41
and she did not feel able to go out in bedroom slippers. The Pounders
court held that, because the nursing home had not physically restrained
Mrs. Pounders, it had not "imprisoned" her.'
D. The Rubric
The tort of false imprisonment is especially interesting when
viewed in the larger context of tort law. It is, of course, an intentional
tort.43 Intentional tort theory has been overshadowed because of the
emphasis on negligence in modern malpractice litigation. Yet existing
studies of nursing home conditions suggest that the most troublesome
conduct is that typically associated with intentional torts."
Despite the paucity of reported cases, intentional tort doctrine thus
has an important contribution to make to nursing home litigation."
The abuses commonly suffered by nursing home residents are ideally
suited to redress by false imprisonment causes of action.4' From a prac-
tical standpoint, however, false imprisonment has been criticized as
lacking the flexibility of a negligence cause of action.'7
Another obstacle to the use of the false imprisonment rubric in
39 J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 23.12, at 487.
40 265 Ark. 1, 576 S.W.2d 934 (1979).
41 See id. at 2, 576 S.W.2d at 935.
42 See id. at 4-5, 576 S.W.2d at 936. The Restatement implicitly recognizes the
role of personal dignity and internalized societal mores in forming constructive bounda-
ries: "A is naked in a Turkish bath. B locks the door into the dressing room but leaves
open the door to the general waiting room where persons of both sexes are congregated.
B has confined A." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 36 comment a, illustration
5 (1965).
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35(1) (1965).
" See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-8, at 75 (noting that possible assault and
battery claims often arise in the nursing home context).
'1 See id.
46 See id.
41 See id. § 3-11, at 80.
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nursing home litigation has been the tendency of courts to interpret the
phrase "false imprisonment" literally, thereby restricting its applica-
tion. The trial court in Pounders, for instance, gave an erroneously
limited statement of the law, which proved fatal to Mrs. Pounders'
case: "False imprisonment means to be in custody against your will, to
have restraints, such as chains, handcuffs, locked doors, barriers or
keeping someone behind walls or within the premises, under a hidden
identity or things of that nature."4 As Prosser has noted, however, "too
much emphasis has been placed upon the technical name of the tort."'49
The Restatement notes that:
(1)An actor is subject to liability to another for false inpris-
onment if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person
within boundaries fixed by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement
of the other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by
it.
50
Section 36 specifies what constitutes confinement:
(1) To make the actor liable for false imprisonment, the
other's confinement within the boundaries fixed by the actor
must be complete.
(2) The confinement is complete although there is a reasona-
ble means of escape, unless the other knows of it. 1
One comment to Section 36 suggests that what is "complete" confine-
ment will vary from person to person: "[Elven though there may be a
perfectly safe avenue of escape, the other is not required to take it if the
circumstances are such as to make it offensive to a reasonable sense of
48 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 7-8, 576 S.W.2d at 937 (Purtle, J., dissenting) (quoting
unpublished trial court opinion).
"I P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 11, at 47 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. But see Schanafelt v. Sea-
board Fin. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 420, 423, 239 P.2d 42, 43 (1951) ("Words or con-
duct furnishing a reasonable apprehension on the part of the one restrained that he will
not be allowed to depart is sufficient."); National Bond Inv. Co. v. Whithorn, 276 Ky.
204, 209, 123 S.W.2d 263, 266 (1938) (finding false imprisonment through wrongful
detention of one's property); Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 51, 147 S.E.2d
710, 713 (1966) ("If a person is under a reasonable apprehension that force will be
used unless he willingly submits, and he does submit to the extent that he is denied
freedom of action, this, in legal contemplation, constitutes false imprisonment."); cf.
infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text (discussing de facto confinement).
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35(1) (1965).
51 Id. § 36.
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decency or personal dignity." 2 This accommodation is important in the
kind of situation encountered by Mrs. Pounders. Similarly, Section 38
notes that "[t]he confinement may be by actual or apparent physical
barriers."53 The comment to Section 38 also stresses the subjective and
varying nature of what constitutes confinement:
a. There is a confinement by physical barriers, under the
rule stated in § 35, if the barriers are actually efficient to
restrain the other or, though they are actually inefficient to
do so, the other believes them to be efficient and the one
setting the barriers intends him so to believe.
b. An act which prevents another from availing himself of a
reasonable means of escape from the area of confinement
may result in a confinement by physical barriers.54
The physical limitations experienced by the elderly patient, when cou-
pled with her dependence on her caretakers, combine to create a force-
ful case for false imprisonment. Indeed, one of the Restatement's guid-
ing illustrations is of the "cripple" whose crutches have been taken by
A; her resulting inability to walk amounts to confinement. 55
E. The Failure of the Rubric
Where does this leave Mrs. Pounders? There are several ways in
which the typical nursing home resident may be as effectively impris-
oned in a home or hospital as the prototypical imprisonee. The impris-
onment may begin before she sets foot in the home, through her real
and/or perceived lack of alternatives. Mrs. Pounders did not want to
enter the home, according to the court, but did so without protest be-
cause she had no place else to go. Her status and lack of bargaining
power rendered her unable to consent. While courts cannot change the
factors leading to the absence of choice, they can recognize the element
of coercion. Again it is important to recognize that "the interest is in a
sense a mental one,"5 analogous to the apprehension of contact in as-
sault cases.5" Furthermore, the action may be maintained without proof
52 Id. comment a.
53 Id. § 38 (emphasis added).
" Id. comments a & b.
" See id. § 38 comment b, illustration 2.
56 PROSSER, supra note 49, § 11, at 47. But see Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 404 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C. 1979) (finding that plaintiff's feeling "mentally
restrained" by defendant not enough to make out false imprisonment).
11 See PROSSER, supra note 49, § 11, at 47-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 29(1) (1965). See generally State v. Ingram, 237 N.C. 197, 201, 74 S.E.2d
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of actual damage.58
Recognition of the mental or subjective element might overcome
the most difficult hurdle in false imprisonment litigation: the physical
element. The Pounders court viewed this obstacle as insurmountable:
No false imprisonment existed because there was "no evidence
whatever either of physical force or of any threat of physical force. To
the contrary, Mrs. Pounders could have left the nursing home at will,
but she simply had nowhere to go and chose to stay." 59
Obviously, the easiest cases will involve patients who are subjected
to physical barriers or actual physical force. In such cases, the subjec-
tive element is irrelevant. Big Town presented a combination of physi-
cal and mental restraints; the plaintiff was punished by being locked
and taped in a "restraint chair" for more than five hours."' The court
did not rest its holding on this factor alone, however; it found evidence
of confinement in that the nursing home prevented him from using the
telephone,61 locked up his clothes, told him that he could not be re-
leased from the ward until he obeyed the rules, and detained him for
fifty-one days despite his persistent demands to be released. Most sig-
nificant, there was no court proceeding to confine the patient. The
court held that the defendant nursing home "acted in the utter disre-
gard of plaintiff's legal rights, knowing there was no court order for
commitment, and that the admission agreement provided he was not to
be kept against his will." 2
False imprisonment doctrine, by acknowledging the restrictive
power of threats, provides courts with a way to assess individual cases
using the subjective effect of the threats on the patient. Threats to re-
strain are more difficult to prove than literal restraint, but, as discussed
above, they may play a significant role in keeping the confined person
532, 535 (1953) (holding violent display "must be such as to cause the reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm"(citation omitted)); Cucinotti v. Ortrnan, 399
Pa. 26, 27, 159 A.2d 216, 217 (1960) (finding that assault is an act "intended to put
another person in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery," and one that suc-
ceeds in doing so); Redfearn v. State, 738 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A]
threat to release snakes into a person's residence ... is calculated to raise a reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm on the part of the person threatened.").
58 See PROSSER, supra note 49, § 11, at 47.
11 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 3, 576 S.W.2d at 935. This point is logically inconsis-
tent and factually inaccurate. The confining nature of Mrs. Pounders' residence became
clear precisely when the nursing home would not release her to her niece, despite the
niece's willingness to take her and Mrs. Pounders' willingness to go. It was the niece
who arranged for the lawyer who finally secured Mrs. Pounders' release. See id. at 6,
576 S.W.2d at 936 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
60 See Big Town, 461 S.W.2d at 197.
" Holding a patient incommunicado can, in and of itself, constitute a restraint
giving rise to a finding of false imprisonment. See id.
62 Id.
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effectively imprisoned. The Restatement requires that the threat be to
apply present physical force, but what constitutes a present threat has
been interpreted with some degree of elasticity. 3 It is particularly im-
portant, given the climate of intimidation that may exist in a nursing
home,64 to remember that confinement can result from duress other
than threats of physical force.65 For example, an Illinois appellate court
held that a threat to commit a patient to a state hospital constituted a
present, not future, threat. 6 Furthermore, the defendant bears the bur-
den of justifying the confinement of the plaintiff; 7 the law does not
require the confined person to justify her desire to leave the nursing
home. 8
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 40 comment a (1965).
[T]he actor's threat [to confine the other] may be by words as well as by
other acts. It is not necessary that he do any other act actually or appar-
ently effectual in carrying a threat into immediate execution. It is enough
that he threatens to apply and has the apparent intention and ability to
apply force to the other's person immediately upon the other's attempting
to escape from the area within which it is the actor's intention to confine
him.
Id.
The illustration to section 40 emphasizes that the immediacy requirement goes to
the thwarting of the attempted escape, not the time of the threat: "B, standing at the
door some feet away, says to A, 'If you attempt to leave this room, I will knock you
down.' B makes no threatening gesture. A, in submission to the threat remains in the
room. B has confined A." Id. illustration 1. Thus, the need for a so-called "present
threat" in making out a case of false imprisonment has been liberally construed. See,
e.g., Hales v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 N.C. 568, 570, 133 S.E.2d 225, 227
(1963) (noting that words that cause a reasonable apprehension in plaintiff concerning
her ability to exercise her liberty constitutes false imprisonment); Gathers v. Harris
Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 230, 317 S.E.2d 748, 755 (1985) ("The tort of
false imprisonment may be committed by words alone... and by merely operating on
the will of the individual . . ").
e' "Even the best nursing homes are total institutions that form an inherently
intimidating environment that has a debilitating effect on the resident and the resident's
sense of personal control over both mundane and major activities." M. KAPP, supra
note 2, at 80.
"I See, e.g., Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. 404 A.2d 147, 151-52
(D.C. 1979) (noting that false imprisonment may be proven if the evidence establishes
"a restraint against the plaintiff's will, as where she yields to force, to the threat of
force or to the assertion of authority" (emphasis added)).
88 See Marcus v. Liebman, 59 Ill. App. 3d 337, 341, 375 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1978)
(finding no false imprisonment when plaintiff voluntarily entered the psychiatric wing
of her local hospital).
87 See, e.g., Beaumont v. Segal, 362 Mass. 30, 32, 283 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1972)
(noting that defendant had the burden of showing justification for the confinement); S.
JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-11, at 81 (noting that "[tihe burden of justifying the
confinement lies with the defendant").
68 See Geddes v. Daughters of Charity, 348 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1965) (hold-
ing false imprisonment shown when psychiatric hospital detained plaintiff after plain-
tiff "begged" to be released, because "further detention in the hospital subsequent to
such withdrawal of the consent consituted a false imprisonment"). See generally 40
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III. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT
RUBRIC
The reasons for the failure of the false imprisonment rubric may
be stated briefly: unlike nursing homes, nursing home residents lack
political and economic power. The institutionalized elderly are in a
double bind, however. While they may perceive themselves to be politi-
cally and economically impotent, courts and the political process as-
sume that the elderly as a group have more power than they actually
have, and that therefore nursing home residents are not in need of spe-
cial protections. e9 This Part explains the failure of the false imprison-
ment rubric by examining the societal, economic, and political under-
pinnings of both the tort system and the nursing home industry. The
analysis assumes that the legal problem cannot be understood outside of
its political, societal, and economic context. Part IV discusses possible
legal solutions within this context.
A. "Internal" and Inherent Obstacles
The problems of perception are both internal and external, indi-
vidual and societal. Age, like
class, race, and gender[,] will affect the extent to which and
the way in which the experience of injury is transformed
into a claim for legal redress: the sense of entitlement to
physical, mental, and emotional well-being... the feeling of
competence to assert a claim and to withstand retaliation; the
capacity to mobilize the legal process, which includes choos-
ing and controlling a lawyer and preparing evidence; and fi-
nancial and emotional resources, which will affect the qual-
ity of legal representation obtained and the ability of the
claimant to overcome opposition and delay in order to pursue
negotiation or litigation to a satisfactory conclusion.7"
Old age, although neither an immutable nor lifelong characteristic,
71
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D False Imprisonment in Connection with Confinement
in Nursing Home or Hospital § 4 (1984) ("[P]atients must be released on request.").
6 See infra note 83 and accompanying text; see also B. VLADECK, supra note 3,
at 193 (describing the elderly as "among the most powerful and well served groups in
society" but noting "the relative indifference of general-purpose organizations of the
elderly toward nursing home issues: 'Those "consumers" who do care about nursing
homes [are] . . .unmobilized and politically impotent' ").
70 Abel, Torts, in THE POLITCS OF LAW 185, 189 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
"' See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)
(per curiam) ("But even old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group in need
of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Instead, it marks a
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nevertheless crucially affects how one views oneself vis-a-vis the legal
system. The paucity of nursing home litigation-most of it filed by sur-
vivors 72-underlines the self-and-other selection involved. In short, the
elderly, like other oppressed groups, are effectively barred from tort
recovery.73 The legal system as a whole, the courts, and even the vic-
tims (because they assume they have no redress) create and perpetuate
this process of exclusion.
The relative lack of nursing home litigation points less to the ab-
sence of a problem than to the economics and politics of nursing home
litigation. Nursing homes are well-financed and organized; the patients
are unorganized, and, by definition, dependent on others. Nevertheless,
although the tort of false imprisonment has its limitations, it can be
used to protect basic physical and emotional rights of nursing home
residents.
7 4
The use of tort law in this context raises specific practical and
political problems. Although obvious, it is important to remember that
the potential litigants are the victims; precisely what makes them so
vulnerable as victims renders them ineffective as litigants: "Resident
plaintiffs in reported tort cases range from 67 to 95 years; females out-
numbered males more than three to one and the plaintiffs were hemi-
plegic, senile, incontinent and unsteady in ambulation. ' '  These char-
acteristics accord with those of nursing home residents generally.
76 Of
course, the combination of old age and low earning capacity translates
into paltry damage awards. 7
The victims' very powerlessness-the cause of these actions to be-
gin with-makes it difficult to bring tort claims. Why does a person
reside in a nursing home where she does not want to be? She has no
place else to go; she has no relatives; she has relatives who are unwill-
ing or unable to house her; she cannot take care of herself; she has
significant physical and/or mental impairment. Recognition of these
factors, however, should not replace the court's independent inquiry
into the plaintiff's claim. Mrs. Pounders ended up in a home because
the relatives with whom she was staying became dissatisfied with the
stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span." (citation omitted)).
72 Approximately 50 percent of the claims against nursing homes are brought by
nursing home residents' "survivors." See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-1, at 69 n.10.
"It is perhaps significant that of the small number of reported cases involving injuries
suffered by nursing home residents, a large percentage are instigated by the resident's
family, after the elderly patient's death." Id. at 68.
"I See-Abel, supra note 70, at 189.
74 See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-7, at 75.
11 Butler, supra note 8, at 641.
76 See id.
7 See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-1, at 68.
19891
918 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
arrangement. The court concluded therefore that "she simply had no-
where to go and chose to stay." 8
Mrs. Pounders' case, however, illustrates the possibility of alterna-
tive arrangements, because she ultimately found a place with another
relative. Furthermore, the fact that no obvious alternatives may exist to
a nursing home does not establish that the resident is not being falsely
imprisoned; at the very least, a different nursing home may be prefera-
ble. It is important to keep the practical problems distinct from the
legal questions; consent must not be determined by convenience or by
unexamined assumptions that the elderly "belong" in nursing homes.79
The profile of the typical plaintiff in nursing home litigation re-
flects the profile of the typical nursing home resident.8" If she is help-
less, disoriented, mentally impaired, or disabled, she is per se dependent
on the very people who are not protecting her rights. These are not
reasons to refrain from bringing such actions; these are reasons for the
courts to be vigilant about protecting the rights of those who may be
unable to protect themselves.
B. Political Factors
To use tort law effectively, one must place the individual in a
larger social and political context, a step the courts are reluctant to
take. Even Mrs. Pounder's champion, the dissenting Justice Purtle,
suggests that the case is "no doubt of little consequence to anyone other
than Margaret Pounders."'" He observes, however, that "[a]s it is with
a large number of our senior citizens, she dreaded the thought of being
placed in a nursing home."82 The juxtaposition of these two statements
reveals an interesting anomaly. The first statement suggests a common
willingness to trivialize and isolate the elderly individual. Implicit in
the second statement is the recognition that this disabled elderly woman
belongs to a class of people who cannot control their most basic choices.
They lack liberty in the most fundamental sense. At the same time,
individual members of this class, especially if they are female or mem-
bers of a racial minority, are perceived not to have political clout. They
7' Pounders v. Trinity Court Nursing Home, Inc., 265 Ark. 1, 3, 576 S.W.2d
934, 935 (1979) (en banc).
11 See B. VLADECK, supra note 3, at 215-18 (discussing the pervasive bias in this
country toward institutionalization of the elderly). Vladeck's major suggestion for nurs-
ing home reform is to encourage the funding of noninstitutionalized care rather than
nursing homes.
"0 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
"1 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 5, 576 S.W.2d at 936 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
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are foolish in the particular and powerless in the aggregate.8 3
The tort of false imprisonment requires us to ask whether the vic-
tim has agreed to be imprisoned, but the question of consent cannot be
understood outside the context of power relations. Pounders found that,
although Mrs. Pounders did not want to enter the home, "she went
without protest." ' Therefore, by agreeing to surrender her freedom of
motion, she agreed to be imprisoned. This double bind is uncomfortably
reminiscent of the rape victim who does not want to have sex but can-
not safely refuse; her "consent" is compelled by the situation. 5
The analogy can serve us in another way. One legacy of the
women's movement stems from the axiom "the personal is political."8 6
Individual interactions between two people cannot be understood apart
from overarching questions of status and power. We perpetuate ine-
qualities by our perception of some wrongs as trivial, or "merely" per-
sonal: "This is a very close question and no doubt of little consequence
to anyone other than Margaret Pounders.
8
1
7
It is important to recognize that the dumping of the elderly in
nursing homes and hospitals is a problem with political dimensions, no
matter how we define "political." From the legislative perspective,
nursing-home political action committees are big political contribu-
tors. 8 In contrast, "[flew nursing-home patients vote. They are not or-
ganized. There is no patient PAC [compared to the powerful nursing-
83 This Comment does not mean to ignore the existence of the senior power move-
ment. The political power of the elderly has been exhaustively studied and is considera-
bly more complex a subject than is herein acknowledged. See J. WILLIAMSON, supra
note 20, at 9-14 (surveying the literature and noting that the power of the aged has
been both overestimated and underestimated). But while there has been extensive con-
sideration of the elderly as a political force, it has also been argued that "[tihe elderly
are perceived as being more effectively organized than they are." Id. at 103. This Com-
ment argues that the court looking at the individual in isolation may not be able to see
how the individual is imprisoned.
84 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 2, 576 S.W.2d at 935.
11 The Restatement hints at this, 1965 style: "A, a young man, takes B, a girl, for
a ride in his car, and offers indecent liberties. A refuses to allow B to leave the car
unless she consents, and drives her several miles. A has confined B." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 36 comment c, illustration 9 (1965).
88 " 'To say that the personal is political means that gender as a division of power
is discoverable and verifiable through women's intimate experience of sexual objectifi-
cation, which is definitive of and synonymous with women's lives as gender female.'"
Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self. A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of Au-
thenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 239 n.72 (1988) (quoting MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 515, 535 (1982)).
87 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 5, 576 S.W.2d at 936 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
88 They have been instrumental in some states in blocking passage of nursing
home bills of rights. See McMath, The Nursing-Home Maltreatment Case, TRIAL,
Sept. 1985, at 52, 52 & 53 n.3.
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home lobby]." 9
There are complex issues involved in translating the recognition of
the elderly as a political force into significant legal protection for nurs-
ing home residents. One danger is to characterize the elderly monolithi-
cally, to see the label of "elderly" as all-embracing. As the burgeoning
field of "political gerontology"9 makes clear, the creation of old people
as a political bloc involves certain pitfalls. Another problem is derived
from the "special treatment/interest" model, which, while providing
certain essential services, separates the elderly from the rest of the pop-
ulation. Once old people are set aside as a problem group that needs
special help, their resource deprivation must be maintained for their
caretakers to justify their existence. Perhaps because more bureaucrats
are needed to deliver indirect services as opposed to direct services,
more resources are funneled into referral agencies at the local level in-
stead of housing or income maintenance. 1 The elderly are, as a group,
exhaustively subjected to social control by the state and others. The
realities of aging help to contribute to dependency, and the separateness
of being a problem group stigmatizes the elderly, even in the name of
reform.
Thus even the solutions perpetuate the problems. Nevertheless,
age-based stereotypes are less damaging than the present alternative.
The elderly patient, involuntarily confined to a nursing home, is sub-
jected to "forced communal living, regimentation, infantilism, segrega-
tion from the outside world, staff impersonalism, and task orienta-
tion."92 All of these conditions facilitate a complete degradation of self.
While the need for political activity is great, the potential for organiz-
ing is low. Residents who refuse to submit to this institutional routine
may face the use of chemical or mechanical restraints.9" Other re-
straints, such as threats, social disapproval, and fear of retaliation, may
be less tangible but equally coercive.9
s9 Id. at 52.
o See J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 3 (defining the field of political geron-
tology as "the study of power as it involves the elderly").
91 See id. at 241.
92 Id. at 233.
9 See id.
Another danger is that the nursing home promotes social control through drugs
or therapies that further the larger goals of the institution: the continuation of the
individual's inability to act autonomously. See id. at 233. Again, what would otherwise
be legally protected-for example, the ability of the individual to be free from re-
straint-will not be considered restraint if ordered under medical supervision. The Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights constitutes a condition of participation for "skilled nursing facili-
ties" and a standard to be met for "intermediate care facilities" to receive Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement. See 42 C.F.R. § 442.311(0(2) (1987). One provision is that
the patient be free from mental and physical abuse as well as chemical and physical
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Furthermore, what gains have been accomplished may stall fur-
ther progress. Many protections have evolved from the patient-as-con-
sumer model, a product of the patients' rights movement,95 itself an
outgrowth of the civil rights movement.96 One possible consequence of
this model is that it may assume elderly patients have more bargaining
power than they actually possess, presupposing that the marketplace is
an adequate regulatory mechanism, and that empowerment comes from
economic clout, not political change.
C. Economic Factors
When attempting to understand the economic factors underlying
the relationship between the average nursing home resident and her
nursing home, one must look not only at the economics of the nursing
home business, especially compared to the relative inadequacy of the
patient's resources, but also at the tort system itself. The numerical
disparity between medical malpractice cases and nursing home cases
97
reflects both the economic impetus for the tort system, and the fact that,
virtually by definition, nursing home residents are generally old and/or
disabled. "Injuries to them, whether fatal or merely debilitating, may
be perceived as having little remunerative potential, especially when the
restraints, unless the restraints are
(i) Authorized by a physician in writing for a specified period of time; or
(ii) Used in an emergency under the following conditions:
(A) The use is necessary to protect the resident from injuring himself or
others.
(B) The use is authorized by a professional staff member identified in the
written policies and procedures of the facility as having the authority to do
SO.
(C) The use is reported promptly to the resident's physician by that staff
member.
Id.
I 5 This Comment deals with common law tort actions rather than federal or state
statutory provisions, although alternative remedies are made available under the stat-
utes. The patients' bill of rights, as codified in the relevant state statute, may support a
private right of action. See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 1-22 at 22; see also Hoffman
& Schreier, A Private Right of Action Under Missouri's Omnibus Nursing Home Act,
24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 661, 674-79 (1981) (discussing the potential of private right of
action to help nursing home residents enforce their rights). The most relevant provision
for our purposes is the guarantee of freedom from chemical and physical restraint. See
42 C.F.R. § 442.311(f)(2) (1987). There is voluminous literature on bills of rights and
their limitations. See, e.g., Caldwell & Kapp, supra note 29, at 41-47 (discussing the
evolution and provisions of a bill of rights for nursing home patients).
98 See Caldwell & Kapp, supra note 29, at 41 ("The notion of patients' rights is
rooted in at least two sociological phenomena: 'consumerism,' which advocates a ques-
tioning, better-informed public; and the civil rights movement, which champions the
cause of vulnerable and powerless minorities.").
11 See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-2, at 69.
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injured person has a short life expectancy and no earning capacity, the
standard measures of damages.""8 Also, the type of injury the tort of
false imprisonment attempts to remedy-the resident's lack of auton-
omy and self-determination-while recognized in the abstract as impor-
tant, may be perceived as too intangible to warrant remuneration. 99
Again, however, the tort itself acknowledges the importance of the
mental component. 0 0
Furthermore, the question of how to use tort remedies involves a
consideration of the role tort law plays in our legal system and society;
it does not exist apart from the economic and political values it embod-
ies and perpetuates: "Contemporary tort law is intimately related to the
rise of capitalism, as both cause and effect."' 0 ' The economic underpin-
nings of tort law raise a number of issues relevant to nursing home
litigation. First, at least seventy percent of nursing homes are operated
for profit;'0 2 the care and housing of the disabled elderly10 3 are second-
ary to profit considerations. Even more particularly, tort law is inextri-
cably bound up in the economics not only of the industry, but of its
victims. If damages are dependent on earning power and "worth," the
typical nursing home resident is not likely to engender much economic
respect.'04
As already suggested, the absence of leading cases and the relative
lack of interest in nursing home litigation 0 5 speak volumes about the
08 Butler, supra note 8, at 641. However, courts have begun to recognize the
inherent disadvantages and lack of incentive elderly nursing home residents face in
bringing suits against nursing homes. See, e.g., Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111
Ill. 2d 350, 369-70, 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1383 (1986) (holding that the legislature could
allow treble damages for ordinary negligence in order to encourage private enforcement
of the state Nursing Home Care Reform Act, when actual damages might not be
enough to warrant instituting an action).
" Furthermore, we tend to assume that dependence, both physical and social, is a
natural or inevitable consequence of growing old, and that aging equals lack of self-
determination. These assumptions have been increasingly challenged by fields as di-
verse as geriatric medicine (which has shown that "senility" is not a natural conse-
quence of growing old, but a catch-all for distinct biological events such as Alzheimer's
disease, depression, and poor nutrition) and political gerontology (which has articulated
the nature of elder power). Cf Comment, Involuntary Relocation of Nursing Home
Residents and Transfer Trauma, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 758, 758-61 (1981) (discussing
the physical and psychological effects of relocation of the elderly or disabled).
100 "[T]he interest is in a sense a mental one, resembling the apprehension of
contact in the assault [situation]." PROSSER, supra note 49, § 11, at 47.
101 Abel, supra note 70, at 186.
102 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
103 Most, but not all nursing home residents are elderly. See S. JOHNSON, supra
note 4, § 3-1, at 68; Johnson, supra note 12, at 681 n.1.
104 See Butler, supra note 8, at 641; see also Nemore, Protecting Nursing Home
Residents: Tort Actions Are One Way, TRIAL, Dec. 1985, at 54, 57 (discussing the
corporatization of nursing homes).
105 See S. JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 3-2, at 69.
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situation. They also raise some specific practical problems for the
would-be nursing home litigator. The nursing home industry has be-
come and continues to be increasingly corporate in nature; large corpo-
rate chains now dominate the field in contrast to twenty-five years ago,
when nursing homes were primarily owned by sole proprietors. 0 6 This
fact has a pervasive impact. The optimistic interpretation is that nurs-
ing home residents may benefit from juries' recognition of the economic
mismatch: if they hear the financial report of a large, "good invest-
ment" nursing home corporation, they "may seriously wonder if too
much money is being spent on corporate growth rather than on neces-
sary patient care."'0° On the other hand, this litigation pits a vulnera-
ble and dependent older person against the resources of a wealthy cor-
poration. Nevertheless, it is important not to assume the victimization
of the nursing home resident as an inevitable fact of life, lest such vic-
timization become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: BORROWING FROM OTHER RUBRICS
A. Reasoning from Civil Commitment and Guardianship
Despite the current situation, the false imprisonment tort action
has a significant role to play in protecting basic rights of nursing home
residents, particularly in conjunction with the concepts of de facto
guardianship and commitment. The problems of civil commitment have
long been recognized, and persons threatened with commitment are en-
dowed with certain basic due process rights to protect their freedom of
liberty.' 08 The standard generally is danger to oneself or others.'0 9
There are also less stringently scrutinized protections for persons who
are assigned guardians."' In other words, once there is a legal process,
there is some degree of scrutiny, however minimal or pro forma. In-
deed, abundant evidence exists that these protections are inadequate."'
106 See Nemore, supra note 104, at 57.
107 Id. at 57.
'08 See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (noting that civil commit-
ment constitutes a "massive curtailment" of one of the most fundamental rights: liberty
of movement).
'09 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1973); see also J. KRAUS-
KOPF, supra note 2, § 4.3, at 43 (describing the five requirements that must be met to
justify involuntary commitment).
1 See generally J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 5.2, at 110 (describing proce-
dural protections against abuse of the system).
. See id. (arguing that the traditional practice in guardianship proceedings ac-
cords "even less protection to the subject person than in mental commitments"); see also
Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship for the Eld-
erly, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1010 (1979) (discussing "illusory procedural safeguards"
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There is a tendency to assume that civil commitment represents
the greatest potential lack of autonomy faced by an elderly person. One
expert argues that this is not so: imposition of a guardianship may be
just as devastating for the elderly person as commitment to a mental
institution." 2
Mental commitment, based on mental illness causing dan-
gerousness, imposes the greatest restraint upon personal lib-
erty but does not necessarily render the committed person
legally incapable of making personal and property decisions.
Guardianship of the person, based on the need for personal
care, grants power to a guardian to make medical decisions
and grant consents, to determine the place of abode of the
ward including a nursing home, and to voluntarily commit
the ward to a mental hospital." 3
Obviously, this degree of power endows the guardian with significant
potential to abuse the ward's dependence, and this potential has been
recognized in the need for proceedings." 4 This power may, in practical
and immediate terms, be even greater than the state's, which we recog-
nize in involuntary civil commitment proceedings.
B. De Facto Guardianship and Commitment
This Comment has argued that many elderly nursing home pa-
tients are subject to the same dangers as persons who are committed or
for whom a guardian is appointed. They are not, however, afforded the
same protections. Mrs. Pounders, it may be recalled, was confined to
the nursing home without having been legally declared incompetent (in
need of a guardian) or dangerous to herself (in need of commitment)." 5
In other words, the relative who placed her there effectively became her
that do not protect elderly people from being adjudged incompetent at hearings at
which they are neither present nor represented by counsel, despite law specifically pro-
viding for their presence or representation on their behalf).
112 See J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 31.
113 Id. § 5.1, at 109 (emphasis added) (citing Uniform Probate Code § 5-312).
114 The power of guardianship includes the power to commit "voluntarily." See
id. As this Comment has argued, the normative concept "voluntary" may mask a mul-
titude of political and societal sins. See, e.g., Szasz, supra note 18, at 404 (discussing
"voluntary" hospitalization as a type of involuntary confinement).
"1 See Pounders v. Trinity Court Nursing Home, Inc., 265 Ark. 1, 576 S.W.2d
934 (1979) (en banc). There seems to have been no question regarding Mrs. Pounders'
mental competence, except perhaps in the mind of the appellate judges; both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions find it important to note that the lawyer who unsuccessfully
attempted to get Mrs. Pounders released found that she was in "full possession of her
faculties." Id. at 937 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
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guardian without any guardianship proceeding taking place. The nurs-
ing home's rule that a patient be released to the person who arranged
for her admission'16  constituted a form of ad hoc, de facto
guardianship.
In some situations, courts have recognized that even patients who
have been placed voluntarily in institutions may be subject to what
amounts to de facto confinement and have accorded them legal protec-
tions similar to those given to persons who have been involuntarily
committed to institutions. 17 These cases are cause for hope. Courts
have found de facto confinement in the case of residents who are dis-
abled, lack readily available resources, or do not have spouse, parents,
friends, or a guardian."" De facto confinement, like the tort of false
imprisonment, has at its heart the acknowledgment that not all re-
straints are physical or even literal, and that what amounts to confine-
ment will vary from situation to situation." 9
Mrs. Pounders' case underlines the need to recognize the binding
nature of de facto confinement, which may come from social control,
medication, threats, and nursing home "policy." Pounders held that
there was no literal constraint, despite the nursing home's refusal to
release Mrs. Pounders with her consent into the custody of a relative
who was willing to take her home with her. The nursing home rejected
the relative's request and "informed her it was the policy of [the nurs-
ing home] to release residents of the home only to the party who en-
tered them into the facility."' a 0 The potential for abuse-specifically,
collusion between the nursing home and relatives to "dump" the resi-
dent-is obvious.' 2 ' In this case, so insistent was the nursing home in
118 See id. at 936.
117 See, e.g., Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating
that a voluntarily committed woman has a constitutional right to a safe and humane
environment); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1123 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding de facto
confinement of a voluntarily committed person); see also Comment, supra note 99, at
767 (discussing de facto confinement of voluntarily committed persons).
118 See Harper, 544 F.2d at 1123; Comment, supra note 99, at 767.
1 The disabled resident of a nursing home requires protection akin to that af-
forded to the psychiatric patient. Although these protections are for the most part statu-
tory, their existence testifies to the special vulnerability of those subject to social control
by labelling and to the power of context to create constructive imprisonment.
120 Pounders, 265 Ark. at 5-6, 576 S.W.2d at 936 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
121 Big Town is shorter on narrative, but it also suggests that Newman was essen-
tially dumped by a relative who found him difficult. See Big Town Nursing Home,
Inc., v. Newman, 461 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (finding that Newman
was taken to the home by a nephew who "signed the admission papers and paid one
month's care in advance"). Newman's repeated attempts to escape (he left at least five
times and each time was brought back) indicate that the relative was not eager or able
to house him. A false imprisonment action presumably could also be brought against
the relative.
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keeping Mrs. Pounders that even the intervention of a lawyer hired by
the relative attempting to free Mrs. Pounders did not sway it. It refused
to relinquish her without the permission of the relative who had
brought her there to begin with. Interestingly, it was only when the
lawyer threatened to file a writ of habeas corpus that the nursing home
decided to release Mrs. Pounders.
122
V. CONCLUSION
Elderly residents of nursing homes lack autonomy to make basic
choices and secure basic rights. This problem cuts across doctrinal
boundaries. The issue is not only complex from a legal standpoint, but
also necessarily involves political, sociological, and medical
considerations.
One approach to nursing home abuses has been through patients'
bills of rights.1 23 These mechanisms presuppose a certain degree of au-
tonomy and self-determination, and there are inequalities that prevent
them from being meaningful.1
24
Tort law traditionally has been fluid, and it has a unique role to
play in the drama of securing basic rights for nursing home residents.
But "modern American legal thought continues to be premised on the
distinction between private law and public law. Private law is still as-
sumed to be about private actors with private rights, making private
choices ... .125 These assumptions are implicit in decisions such as
Pounders and they are why the doctrinal rubrics, taken on their own
terms, are inadequate. Mrs. Pounders' imprisonment cannot be under-
stood by courts who insist that only physical imprisonment is true im-
prisonment. Mrs. Pounders was tied down by her age, her sense of her
lack of alternatives, nursing home policies, her status as an elderly per-
son in society, her own disabilities, her perception of herself, and, fi-
nally, by antiquated and literalist notions of what constitutes false
imprisonment.
122 See Pounders, 265 Ark. at 6, 576 S.W.2d at 937. The majority saw no signifi-
cance in this fact: "That [the attorney] saw fit to suggest the possibility of an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus did not somehow have the effect of physically imprison-
ing Mrs. Pounders, who was upstairs in her room and could have walked out by
herself if she had chosen to do so." Id.
12 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
124 Even the relatively politically neutral approach of the practitioner suggests that
tort may do what legislation cannot: "[W]ith an impotent regulatory agency and timid
politicians, the only place nursing-home victims and their families can go for relief is to
court with a good trial lawyer." McMath, supra note 88, at 52.
125 Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 70, at 32.
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This Comment does not suggest that one court can or should dis-
pose of all those difficulties in a single tort action. Rather, it suggests
that the framework is there for us to build on: the doctrinal capacious-
ness of the tort of false imprisonment; the recognition of de facto com-
mitment and guardianship; and the increasing refusal to pretend that
the individual functions in a vacuum, outside of the larger political and
economic dimensions governing her.
It is imperative that we build on these factors in order to antici-
pate the objections that have limited the tort's effectiveness in the past.
The tort of false imprisonment can be a viable tool for securing the
rights of elderly nursing home residents. None of us can afford for long
to dismiss these rights or take them for granted.

